INTRODUCTION
In 1790, Congress split its patent power. 3 Rather than grant patents itself by private bill, Congress enacted a general patent law, 4 creating a patent board in the Executive Branch with the delegated power to grant patents according to statutorily prescribed standards. 5 The Patent Office (the Office) we know today, created in the 1836 Patent Act, 6 received its broadest grant of regulatory power from Congress in 1870. 7 The terms of the grant remain the same today: "The Office... may establish regulations, not inconsistent with law, which ... shall govern the conduct of proceedings in the Office .... "8 Just how broad is this grant?
It is settled that Congress has given the Patent Office the power to issue procedural rules for patent examination at the Office, not substantive at the heart of the Tafas cases-thus remains in doubt. The agency problems that inspired the rules continue. New rules, likely to trigger strong objections from at least some of the patent system's repeat players, "Increased Workload and Backlog"). 13. See id. at 46,716-17 (reporting objections received during the public comment period on the draft regulations). The rules purportedly sought to streamline the process whereby applicants press their claims to utility patent protection over time. Specifically, the rules, if implemented, would have limited the availability of continuation applications and requests for continued examination (Final Rules 78 and 114), and-for applications containing either more than five independent claims or more than twenty-five total claimswould have required an applicant to submit a new "examination support document," or ESD, explaining the prior art information presented to the Office (Final Rules 75 and 265). Thus far, the courts have failed to provide a robust standard for sorting proposed Patent Office rules into procedure and substance boxes, parsing the valid from the invalid. Perhaps this should be expected. Procedure and substance are protean concepts; they "carry no monolithic meaning at once appropriate to all the contexts in which courts have seen fit to employ them." 20 Indeed, courts sort the two from one another with different standards, depending on the reason for sorting them in a given case.
Although it is tough to frame a stable sorting standard for the Patent Office context, it can and should be done. 21 The alternative-fitful ad hoceryfrustrates planning and wastes resources. Thus, the Federal Circuit should put the scope of the Patent Office's procedural power on firm ground, for the sake of the Office and patent applicants alike.
The courts have flirted with a range of power-defining options for the patent law context, most notably the substance-procedure distinction in notice-and-comment rulemaking conducted under § 553 of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).22 This APA framework, however, is actually quite ill-suited for the Patent Office. This framework is designed to protect public participation in rulemaking proceedings conducted by agencies that-unlike the Patent Office-have the power to make substantive rules with the force of law (f-they use notice-and-comment) but can dispense with notice-and-comment for "rules of agency organization, procedure, or practice." 23 Such agencies may be tempted to save time and 19 . The press release about the Tafas case settlement speaks in these terms. According to Director Kappos, " [t] his course of action represents the most efficient way to formally and permanently move on from these regulations and work with the IP community on new ways to take on the challenges these regulations were originally designed to address." Id (1982) ("But the logical and practical difficulties of classifying a matter as procedure or substance are not sufficient reason to abandon the enterprise, at least when it is required by statute.").
22. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (2006) . In the Tafas litigation, both the district court and the Federal Circuit discussed the Administrative Procedure Act's (APA's) substance-procedure distinction. The Federal Circuit, however, was careful to state that it "d[id] not purport to set forth a definitive rule for distinguishing between substance and procedure in" that, or any, case. Tafas H1, 559 F. is to guarantee to the public an opportunity to participate in the rule making process. With stated exceptions, each agency will be required under this section to give public notice of substantive rules which it proposes to adopt, and to grant interested persons an opportunity to present their views to it."); see also id. at 9 (listing, expense by miscategorizing a substantive rule as procedural. 2 4 When a court later analyzes whether a challenged rule from such an agency is substantive or procedural, what is really at stake is how--not whether-the agency can establish the substantive rule it wants. By contrast, the Patent Office question of interest here is precisely whether the Office can issue a rule because it is procedural. This Article identifies a stable standard for sorting procedural from substantive rules that better fits the way Congress has split responsibility for granting patents between itself and the Patent Office. The allocation is straightforward: Under the general-purpose patent regime it established in 1836, and that continues today, Congress sets detailed substantive policy in the Patent Act to govern the patentability of all patent applications, and the Patent Office examines individual applications for Patent Act compliance in proceedings for which it has established procedures by rule. 25 What sorting standard fits this allocation of responsibility? The key is to recognize that the way that Congress has split its patent power echoes strongly in the among the APA's "four basic purposes," the purpose "[t]o provide for public participation in the rule making process" If an agency wants to defend its abbreviated process for generating a challenged rule on the ground that the rule is merely procedural, the reviewing court's task isunderstandably-to beware an agency attempt to cut this rulemaking corner and thereby cut the public out of its commenting role. As the D.C. Circuit has put it, "[t]he issue... 'is one of degree,' and our task is to identify which substantive effects are 'sufficiently grave so that notice and comment are needed to safeguard the policies underlying the APA."' JEM Broad. Co This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I takes up two preliminary matters.
First, Congress has created the necessity for Patent Office procedural rules by splitting the patent power's substantive and procedural parts between the Legislative and Executive Branches. Had Congress exercised the patent power entirely by itself, in the unified form in which the Constitution confers it, matters of patent-petition procedure might have Professor Kerr has, in a similar vein, compared the Office's regulatory grant to a trial court's inherent power to manage its cases. See Kerr, supra note 25, at 166-67 ("Congress delegated to the PTO a narrowly circumscribed regulatory authority to manage PTO proceedings, roughly analogous to the power that a federal district court may exercise over the management of its own cases. Pursuant to this explicit grant of regulatory power, the PTO Commissioner has promulgated over 300 pages of regulations....
The Federal Circuit has properly applied deferential standards of review (including Chevron) to such rules, much like appellate courts afford deferential standards of review to district court trialmanagement decisions." (footnotes omitted)).
28. Cf Burlington N. R.R. v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1, 5 (1987) ("Rules which incidentally affect litigants' substantive rights do not violate this provision if reasonably necessary to maintain the integrity of that system of rules.").
remained less differentiated from matters of patent-policy substance than they are today. However, having delegated patent application review to the Office, under a Patent Act text that is much longer on patentability substance than it is on examination procedure, Congress made Officepromulgated procedural rules inevitable. Second, it is a truism that procedural choices affect substantive results. As a consequence, courts cannot test the validity of Patent Office rules simply according to whether they affect substantive results. To do so would collapse the very separation of procedure from substance that Congress established in the Patent Act. Thus, "affects substance" is the one sorting standard that we know to a certainOy is incorrect.
Part Others call it the Intellectual Property Clause, though, again, the phrase is absent, and the word "property," which is used in the Constitution (but not here), abounds with connotation. Still others call it the Exclusive Rights Clause, which at least has the virtue of a textual ground; but that name highlights the legal tool it gives Congress to use, rather than the social goal it empowers Congress to pursue. I call it the Progress Clause.
33. "The First Congress, having opened on March 4, 1789, was only a little more than a month old when it first received two petitions relating to intellectual property." BRUCE W. BUGBEE, GENESIS OF AMERICAN PATENT AND COPYRIGHT LAW 131 (1967). PetitionerJohn Churchman "claimed that he had invented certain methods of navigation by means of magnetic variation," and "[h]e asked for the passage of a law vesting in him the exclusive right to sell in the United States all globes, maps, and tables constructed according to the principles which he had devised." Id. at 132. Several more petitions for private patent bills followed. Id. at 133-36; see also WALTERSCHEID, supra note 6, at 81-87 (discussing congressional receipt and consideration of these early petitions).
34. This procedural statute, which shaped the inputs that Congress would assess, demonstrates the inevitability of procedural requirements within a general patent regime for an innovation-hungry, market-driven republic like our own. And, although this particular statute was long ago repealed, 43 Congress continues to extend the terms of individual patents legislatively, using whatever procedural and substantive standards it deems best in the circumstances. 44 The patent power's procedural component did not, of course, disappear when Congress delegated the review of patent applications to the Executive. Procedural power flowed, inexorably, to the Executive. For example, under the 1790 Patent Act, the patent board "gradually developed a few rules and regulations, as to matters of form as well as to matters of substance." 45 At its second meeting, the board "instructed several inventors who were present to provide models of their inventions," and it requested more information, in varied forms, from the inventors with whom it met in the succeeding weeks.
46
Such practices (applicant interviews, disclosure requests) ripened into regular procedure. Under the 1793 Act, which changed the Executive's role from one of examining compliance with substantive requirements to one of managing a registration system (with court review of substantive validity in any later infringement case), 47 Admittedly, none of these rules packages approaches the complexity and detail of Title 37 of the Code of Federal Regulations, under which patent applicants now operate. All, however, show that, from the beginning, the executive officials empowered to grant applications under our Patent Acts have established procedural rules for handling those applications fairly and efficiently.
The Office acted out of necessity in promulgating procedural rules, for the Patent Acts themselves focused on substantive patentability standards and top-level features of the patent system, rather than the fine details of examination procedure. Consider, again, the 1836 Patent Act.
52 Its twenty-one sections occupy approximately eight pages in the Statutes at Large. In § § 1 to 4, it creates both the Office and the Commissioner and clerk positions, and addresses formal matters such as employee oaths and bonds, the Office seal, and the charge for certified copies of official documents. Section 5 prescribes the form of the issued patent document. Section 9 sets application fees, § 10 makes a pending application inheritable, and § 11 makes a patent assignable by a writing. [63:1 establishes a library for the Office, § 20 obliges the Commissioner to display the models of inventions the Office receives, and § 21 repeals prior patent statutes and provides transition rules for pending patent applications and court actions. In short, the bulk of the Act focuses on matters other than the details of how the Office is to carry out its primary job, the detailed examination of patent applications to determine whether they meet substantive patentability standards. The core of the 1836 Act- § § 6 through 8-establishes the substantive standards for patentability 53 and the basic framework for Office examination of an applicant's eligibility for patent protection. 5 4 Section 6 does require the application to be in writing, but says nothing about the form of that writing. Indeed, it does not even specify the particular language in which the application should be provided. Section 6 also requires an applicant to submit drawings "where the nature of the case admits of drawings" without stating who makes that determination or how to do so; similarly, it requires an applicant to "furnish a model.., in all cases which admit of a representation by a model," without providing who determines the propriety of a model or how to do So. 55 Perhaps most striking, § 7 sets a basic framework for the Office to examine an application for patentability, including an applicant's right to respond to an initial rejection and right to appeal to a board of examiners, but does not state a single time period, timeline, or deadline for doing so. Section 8 requires the Office to decide who among interfering applicants to the same subject matter has priority as the true first inventor, but says nothing about how to make such a determination. Such bare bones demand more detailed implementation procedures. 56 If the Office did not provide them, who would? Congress, by delegating patent examination to the Executive in broad terms, made Office-promulgated procedural rules inevitable. While the general features of these proceedings may properly be made the subject of permanent provisions in the statutes, their numerous and ever varying details can be controlled only by the vigilant and flexible authority of the department in which they arise. For this reason power has been conferred upon the Commissioner of Patents to adopt such regulations as he may deem expedient for the conduct of the business committed to his charge.").
regulatory grant in the 1870 Patent Act was, in a sense, simply an acknowledgment of facts already on the ground: "The 1870 [Patent Office] rules, although they professed to be under the amended laws of 1870 ... , were quite similar to the rules of 1869. " 57 The allocation thereafter, at any rate, is plain: Congress sets the substantive standards of patentability, and the Patent Office prescribes procedures for examining applications for compliance with those patentability standards.
This substance-procedure allocation, like every such allocation, separates in name things that remain interrelated in fact. It is widely acknowledged, for example, that "virtually all procedural rules may, and on occasion do, affect the result of the litigation." 58 As then-Professor Easterbrook put it, "[s]ubstance and process are intimately related. The procedures one uses determine how much substance is achieved, and by whom." 59 For example, "[w]hen the discovery rules were adopted in 1938, they were expected to make a trial less about sport and ambush, and more about truth and evidence. 'This presupposed that [those rules] would change the results in many cases."' 60 Or, to take an example from contemporary patent law, consider this: the patent application document that one files with the Patent Office must " [63:1 not substantive, but procedural, at least for purposes of § 2(b)(2)(A). Of course, the requirement that applicants present their applications in the English language is procedural in that it regulates the formal manner in which an applicant presents her patent claims for examination, in much the same way that the rules about paper type and margins, 62 the sequence of application components, 63 and drawings 64 do. The requirement also has profound substantive consequences, however, because the numbered claim paragraphs at the close of every patent define the very substance of the patentee's right to exclude others from his or her invention. 65 Indeed, "[t]he first step in any [patent] invalidity or infringement analysis is claim construction. '66 Choosing English for Patent Office proceedings, then, plainly contributes to fair and efficient patent examination, and equally plainly affects the scope of the resulting patent rights.
Procedural choices affect substantive outcomes. As a result, were we to use the "affects substance" criterion for sorting Patent Office rules into the substance and procedure categories, the procedure category would collapse to an empty set. But Congress has explicitly ruled out treating procedure as an empty set by the very act of splitting the patent power's applicationprocessing role off from the patentability-defining role and delegating the former to the Patent Office, along with the power to promulgate procedural rules. The trial court in Tafas, by leaning so heavily on an "affects substance" sorting standard, 67 sharply curtailed the Office's regulatory power in the teeth of the Patent Act's basic allocation of responsibilities. The Federal Circuit panel in Tafas II, by contrast, had the good sense to reject this antistatutory standard.
68
What sorting standard should the courts use in policing the boundary the Patent Act creates between valid procedural rules and invalid substantive 62. 37 C.F.R. § 1.52(a)(l)(i)-(ii). Common sense and experience indicate that "substance and procedure differ even if, at the margin, they become difficult to distinguish." 69 They differ as follows: "Substantive law refers to that body of principles designed to regulate primary human activity; procedural law refers to that body of principles designed to provide a means for adjudicating controversies over rights derived from the substantive law." ' 70 Thus, for example, the requirement that an invention must be nonobvious to be patentable 71 and the patentee's right to sue an infringer 72 are clearly on the substantive side of the line, whereas the required use of white paper for a patent application 73 and the availability of interrogatories in a patent infringement suit 74 are just as clearly on the procedural side of the line.
Some matters, however, "are rationally capable of classification as either" substance or procedure. 75 They effectively "fall within a twilight zone between both classifications. ' And the courts best aid Congress if they support, rather than undermine, the basic structure of the patent system that the Patent Act creates. As a result, when an applicant challenges an Office rule under § 2(b)(2)(A), the court should ask, has the Patent Office improperly invaded the patentability policy territory of Congress? Or, instead, has the Office properly sought to establish and preserve a fair and efficient examination system? The courts, if they attend to the purpose of § 2(b)(2)(A), should tune their sorting standard so that it preserves this basic allocation of responsibility. Other bases for distinguishing procedure from substance that arise in different contexts, such as ensuring public participation in the rulemaking process or preventing forum shopping in diversity cases, simply do not apply. 80 To translate the proper court goal, just described, into a workable legal standard that the Office and private parties alike can apply, it helps to distinguish between two distinct errors the Office can make in determining the validity of a given rule and compare them to the analogous errors a court can make when adjudicating a challenge to that rule. Thinking about the possible errors, and possible congressional responses, can highlight which actor-the Office or the court-is in a better position to evaluate a rule's procedural bona fides in the same manner Congress would.
Suppose the Office considers changing the examination rules, and it knows that the change will generate more accuracy gains than process costs. The Office can adopt the rule, or forbear from adopting the rule. Congress, in response, can leave the new rule in place, or countermand it distinction used in applying the Ee doctrine from the substance-procedure distinction used to test the validity of a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure under the Rules Enabling Act).
78. The Patent Office will not promulgate plainly substantive rules, and patent applicants will not attack plainly procedural rules on § 2 grounds.
79. I concede that, as a formal matter, either Due Process rationality review or the nondelegation doctrine marks the outer boundary of Congress's power to delegate a portion of the patent power to the Office. But those boundaries are on the very distant horizon, given the Patent Act's detailed substantive patentability standards and the Office's regulatory focus on examination for patentability. As for delegating to the courts the common law task of elaborating on the broadly phrased substantive patentability and infringement criteria set forth in the Patent Act, Congress has long done so. The Office can err by forbearing when Congress would not countermand the change, i.e., by failing to make an efficient change to examination in the mistaken belief that Congress would view the change as an invasion of its power to set substantive patent policy. Congress can correct this error, of course, by enacting the change itself, assuming that Congress learns about the error; and, were Congress to consider doing so, the Office (by hypothesis) would support the change in the legislative process. It is not clear, however, how the courts could correct this type of error.
2
The Office also can err by adopting a rule that Congress would reject, in the mistaken belief that Congress would not view the change as an invasion of its preserve of substantive patent policy. Congress can correct this error by amending the Patent Act, and Congress will learn about the new rule if it falls especially hard on applicants from a particular technology domain. The courts, too, can correct this error, in an action against the Office under the APA. This is not a domain that cries out for judicial second-guessing. The Office should, if it is concerned with efficiency, minimize the sum of the expected costs of the two foregoing types of errors. Given the Office's long success with its procedural rules, and its ongoing relations with its congressional oversight committees, the Office should have a reasonably strong sense for what Congress will, and will not, allow. And, putting court review to one side, the root criterion of what is procedural for Patent Act purposes is whether "Congress will allow it."
Now assume the Office has gone ahead and actually adopted a new rule governing patent examination. A court reviewing the rule's validity faces a profile of potential hits and misses not unlike the one the Office faced. The court can void the rule or uphold it. The rule itself embodies the Office's assessment that Congress would deem the new rule to be procedural and thus leave it intact. In that sense, the imagined reaction of Congress to the new rule is key to both error profiles. The court, however, is a step further removed from Congress in this scenario. The court is, in effect, reassessing the Office's assessment of congressional reaction. Consider the given its relatively greater distance from Congress, should also embrace some form of deference on the prior question whether a challenged regulation is procedural. 86 As a policy matter, court deference makes sense in light of the Office's superior ability and experience-compared to the court-to assess whether Congress would view a particular new rule as an improper invasion of its substantive turf, at least in a case where the Patent Act is ambiguous. (Where the Act is not ambiguous, the Office and the courts alike are bound to follow it. In sum, § 2(b)(2)(A) allocates power between Congress and the Patent Office. Congress can fend off invasions from the Office. The Office has long enjoyed success in framing rules that meet with apparent congressional approval, if the lack of countermands is any indication, and its ongoing relations with oversight committees give it helpful guidance for staying on its side of the line between procedure and substance. Courts can play backstop for Congress, policing the substance-procedure boundary for the (admittedly unlikely) extreme outlier. These arrangements and the error profiles they produce suggest that the standard for distinguishing procedure from substance should give the Office substantial freedom to treat as procedure the matters in the twilight zone between clear procedure and clear substance. that lacks any credible examination management rationale. And a court should uphold a rule against a § 2 attack where the Office can explain the way in which that rule reasonably helps the Office establish or preserve a fair and effective examination process for applicants, notwithstanding some incidental effects on applicants' substantive rights.
The courts have not yet used this standard for distinguishing procedure from substance under the Patent Act. In Tafas H, the Federal Circuit's most recent effort to articulate a sorting standard, the panel opinion (now vacated) adapted the APA-based sorting standard the D.C. Circuit used in JEM Broadcasting Co. v. FCC. 88 JEM involved a challenge to a rule the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) had issued without notice-andcomment, i.e., without providing the opportunity for public participation mandated by § 553 of the APA. According to the Federal Circuit in Tafas 11, adapting JEM, the Final Rules challenged in this case are procedural. In essence, they govern the timing of and materials that must be submitted with patent applications. The Final Rules may "alter the manner in which the parties present... their viewpoints" to the USPTO, but they do not, on their face, "foreclose effective opportunity" to present patent applications for examination.
89
Even though it was "most persuaded in this case by the D.C. Circuit's approach in jEM," 90 the court was also at pains to underscore that it "d [id] not purport to set forth a definitive rule for distinguishing between substance and procedure." 91 Admittedly, the Tafas H panel opinion would not have had a different bottom-line result if the Federal Circuit had used the framework I outline above. The case would, however, have provided a robust standard for future cases, rather than an explicit flight from any "definitive rule."
It is, of course, fair to ask whether the courts have confronted a substance-procedure distinction analogous to the Patent Act's, and whether, in that other domain, the courts afford the procedural rulemaker the kind of leeway I urge for the Patent Office. The short answer to both 90. Tafas I, 559 F.3d at 1355. 91 . Id. at 1356. One can hope this is judicial humility, rather than an effortunconscious or not-to keep case-by-case court review the main event in any major Patent Office rulemaking process. In any event, both the Office and the public would be better served by the humility of a clearly stated general standard that they can apply and predict.
ADMINIsTRATIVE L4 wREIEW
questions is, "yes."
The analogous distinction is the one Congress established in the Rules Enabling Act (REA),92 first enacted in 1934. 93 The literature on the REA is vast and rich. 94 It is not my aim to canvass it in detail here, much less to take sides in the many nuanced debates it contains. Rather, my goal is simply to show the way in which the Supreme Court's REA jurisprudence provides a ready template that fits the sorting function the Patent Act's structure suggests. The Patent Act is, in effect, a rules enabling act. One last point before discussing the REA: The legislative history of the 1870 Patent Act-the original source of the § 2 standard-supports the view that courts should analyze the scope of the Patent Office's power to make rules for the conduct of proceedings in the Office along the same lines that courts use to analyze the Supreme Court's power under the REA to make rules for the conduct of federal litigation. Specifically, during a floor debate in the House, "Congressman Jenckes, who was the committee chairman and the sponsor of the pending legislation," 95 Recognizing that the Rules will often have incidental impacts on substantive concerns, the Court has confined the Act's substantive right limitation to exclude from its reach primarily procedural rules whose impact beyond the courthouse walls is merely incidental. This is so, even if that incidental and unintended substantive impact is substantial.1 0 '
Generally speaking, the analysis tilts strongly in favor of upholding a Rule. 02 With this summary in view, it is helpful to trace the major cases 97. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a)-(b). The Rules process also has, as a formal matter, an explicit window for congressional disapproval of proposed Rules, but there is less to it than meets the eye. See infia notes 134-38 and accompanying text.
98. Ides, supra note 70, at 30. 99. Burbank, supra note 21, at 1106; see also id. at 1113 ("The purpose of the procedure/substance dichotomy is... to allocate policy choices-to determine which federal lawmaking body, the Court or Congress, shall decide whether there will be federally enforceable rights regarding the matter in question and the content of those rights."); Elizabeth T. Lear, Congress, the Federal Courts, and Forum Non Conveniens: Friction on the Frontier of the Inherent Power, 91 IowA L. REv. 1147, 1180 (2006) ("The Rules Enabling Act establishes a detailed mechanism through which the Court may create procedural law with input from Congress, reserving to Congress the right to enact prospective federal legislation implicating substantive rights.").
100. See Willy v. Coastal Corp., 503 U.S. 131, 136 (1992) ("Article I, § 8, cl. 9, authorizes Congress to establish the lower federal courts. From almost the founding days of this country, it has been firmly established that Congress, acting pursuant to its authority to make all laws 'necessary and proper' to their establishment, also may enact laws regulating the conduct of those courts and the means by which their judgments are enforced." (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, §8, cl. 18)); Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1941) ("Congress has undoubted power to regulate the practice and procedure of federal courts, and may exercise that power by delegating to this or other federal courts authority to make rules not inconsistent with the statutes or constitution of the United States .... " (footnotes omitted)).
101. Redish 116 Hanna sued in diversity in Massachusetts federal court on a tort claim arising from a car accident in South Carolina. 117 Hanna served the deceased defendant's executor validly under Rule 4, but invalidly under a Massachusetts state statute applicable to executors. 1 18 Quoting the reasoning from Sibbach and Murphree liberally for support, the Court concluded that the Rule "clearly passes muster. Prescribing the manner in which a defendant is to be notified that a suit has been instituted against him, it relates to the practice and procedure of the district courts."
119 And, after a lengthy discussion disentangling REA analysis from the Erie doctrine's focus on "discouragement of forum-shopping and avoidance of inequitable 110. 326 U.s. 438 (1946 125. "If a court of appeals determines that an appeal is frivolous, it may, after a separately filed motion or notice from the court and reasonable opportunity to respond, award just damages and single or double costs to the appellee." FED. R. APp. P. 38. The Rule was amended in 1994 to provide for pre-imposition notice and an opportunity to respond. Other than that, the present Rule is the same as the one the Court evaluated in Burlington Northern. See 480 U.S. at 4 ("Entitled 'Damages for delay,' Rule 38 provides: 'If the court of appeals shall determine that an appeal is frivolous, it may award just damages and single or double costs to the appellee."'). Noting that this REA challenge "ha[d] a large hurdle to get over," the Court applied Hanna and Burlington: "There is little doubt that Rule 1 1 is reasonably necessary to maintain the integrity of the system of federal practice and procedure, and that any effect on substantive rights is incidental." 131 The pattern is plain. In all these cases there were, of course, reasonable arguments that the challenged rules were substantive, not procedural. In that sense, the cases were hard; indeed, the Supreme Court likely would have refused review had it been otherwise. But in each case the Court gave wide berth to REA rulemaking. If a rule regulates a matter that one can reasonably classify as procedural, it is valid under the REA, notwithstanding incidental effects the rule may have on a litigant's substantive rights. Congress can, of course, change any rule it likes, either by stopping a proposed rule from going into force or by passing a procedural statute that creates a rule directly. The courts should verify the procedural bona fides of Patent Office rules using the same standard. To wit: A Patent Office rule that incidentally affects applicants' substantive rights nevertheless passes muster under § 2(b)(2)(A) of the Patent Act if the rule is reasonably necessary to establish or preserve the fair and effective patent examination process that the Office's rules must organize. 1
33
One might object to adapting the REA sorting standard for use in the Patent Act context on the ground that the federal court rulemaking process, unlike the Office's rulemaking process, expressly provides for a period of congressional review before a new court rule takes effect. According to the statute,
[t]he Supreme Court shall transmit to the Congress not later than May 1 of the year in which a rule prescribed under section 2072 is to become effective a copy of the proposed rule. Such rule shall take effect no earlier than December 1 of the year in which such rule is so transmitted unless otherwise provided by law. 1
34
One could argue that, under this provision, the failure of Congress to prevent a rule from taking effect is strong evidence that Congress thinks the rule is on the right side of the line between procedure and substance. In Sibbach, in fact, the Supreme Court expressed just this view. . Justice Frankfurter, in dissent, was quite skeptical of the argument, opining that "to draw any inference of tacit approval from non-action by Congress is to appeal to unreality." Id. at 18 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
136. See Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 750 n.9 (1980) ("This is not to suggest that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are to be narrowly construed in order to avoid a 'direct collision' with state law. The Federal Rules should be given their plain meaning. If a direct collision with state law arises from that plain meaning, then the analysis developed in Hanna v. Plumer applies.").
[63:1 construing the rules themselves. Specifically, it construes disputed terms in the rules more narrowly to avoid overstepping the REA's prohibition against a rule's abridging, enlarging, or modifying substantive rights.
137
This policy canon makes no sense if one takes seriously the idea that congressional scrutiny from May to December, under the § 2074(a) waiting period, largely squares the rule's text with existing substantive law. The policy canon seems, in other words, to acknowledge that congressional acquiescence is a sign of indifference, not a sign of full vetting by Congress.
1 3 8 The fact that the Patent Office promulgates rules without a formal congressional review period is thus no reason to abjure the REA framework in the Patent Act context. Federal law offers another substance-procedure distinction resembling the one the Patent Act establishes-namely, the EEOC's power to issue procedural rules (but not substantive rules) under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 139 "The EEOC was created in 1964 with the enactment of Title VII," and it "has primary enforcement authority over Title VII," as well as other civil rights statutes.
140
As part of this enforcement regime, the EEOC investigates charges of unlawful discrimination that private parties bring to its attention. 141 In a recent case challenging a rule that the EEOC had promulgated pertaining to the lodging of charges against an employer, the Supreme Court approached the substance-procedure distinction in a manner similar to its REA cases. By way of background, a private party initiates EEOC involvement by filing a "charge" with the Commission. Under the statute, "[c]harges shall be in writing under oath or affirmation and shall contain such information and be in such form as the Commission requires." 142 The statute also sets time limits within which a charge must be filed: "within one hundred and eighty days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred," or, if the charging party "has initially instituted proceedings with a State or local agency with authority to grant or seek relief' from unlawful employment practices, "within three hundred days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred, or within thirty days after receiving notice that the State or local agency has terminated the proceedings under the State or local law, whichever is earlier." 143 Title VII does not, however, make clear whether a charge that is lodged with the EEOC before the statutory time has run, but is verified by oath or affirmation afler that time has run, is valid or fatally defective. The EEOC, by regulation, relates a subsequent verification back to the date the charge was originally filed. I
In Edelman v. Lynchburg College, 145 the Supreme Court considered the validity of the EEOC's regulation treating a later-verified charge as timely. Edelman, the complaining party, filed his charge with the EEOC 161 days after the alleged discriminatory event but did not verify it until 313 days after that event. 46 The Fourth Circuit, affirming the district court's dismissal of Edelman's case, "held that the plain language of the statute foreclosed the EEOC regulation allowing a later oath to relate back to an earlier charge."' 47 definition by necessary implication. 1 49 The EEOC bridged this statutory gap in procedure as part of its mandate to fairly and efficiently deal with the charges it receives. Indeed, the Court dismissed Lynchburg College's argument that the rule was impermissibly substantive as "really nothing more than a recast of the plain language argument" that the Court found unpersuasive. 1 50 Moreover, as a policy matter, the Court approved the EEOC's "reasonable" gap-filling regulation for both "ensur[ing] that the lay complainant, who may not know enough to verify on filing, will not risk forfeiting his rights inadvertently" and "look[ing] out for the employer's interest by refusing to call for any response to an otherwise sufficient complaint until the verification has been supplied."'' Most importantly, for my purposes, the Court analogized the EEOC rule to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c), concluding that "if relation back is a good rule for courts of law, it would be passing strange to call it bad for an administrative agency."' 152 The Court thus viewed the EEOC's procedural regulation through the same lens it views the rules the federal courts promulgate under the REA. There is no reason to approach Patent Office procedural rules any differently.
In sum, the courts should sort procedure from substance in Patent Office rules using the same basic approach the Supreme Court has used in the REA context. Specifically, a Patent Office rule that incidentally affects applicants' substantive rights does not violate § 2(b)(2)(A) of the Patent Act if the rule is reasonably necessary to establish or preserve the integrity of the patent examination process that the Office's rules must organize. This approach, which gives the Office substantial leeway in the twilight zone of matters that one could rationally classify as procedure or substance, recognizes the Office's superior ability (relative to the courts) to frame rules that establish or preserve a fair and efficient examination process without running afoul of Congress's reserved power over substantive patent policy. . Courts should resist these temptations, for both the APA and RDA sorting standards were developed to serve goals far removed from that of the Patent Act's aim of allocating responsibility for different facets of our long-divided patent power. Before discussing these inapposite frameworks in detail, however, I explain the idiosyncratic way the Patent Act invokes the APA's rulemaking requirements.
A. The Patent Act's Reliance on Notice-and-Comment Rulemaking
For at least a decade, it has been clear that "the PTO is an 'agency' subject to the APA's constraints." '155 And for several decades, the Office has followed the APA's notice-and-comment framework for promulgating binding rules of practice.
156 Commissioner Caspar Ooms, for example, speaking at an New York University Law School conference about administrative law in February 1947, described the Office's past and planned compliance with the strictures of notice-and-comment rulemaking under the APA.
157
More recently, in 1999, Congress codified that tradition. At the same time that it moved the longstanding grant of procedural regulatory power from § 6 to § 2 of the Act, 58 Congress qualified the grant with an explicit reference to the part of the APA that establishes notice-and-comment rulemaking. The operative language in the Patent Act now states as follows:
153. 5 U.S.C. § § 551-559, 701-706 (2006 In other words, when it wants to issue a rule to "govern the conduct of proceedings in the Office" that binds the public and appears among the formal rules of Patent Office practice in Title 37 of the Code of Federal Regulations, the Office must use notice-and-comment rulemaking to promulgate that rule.
Those familiar with the APA will appreciate that my construction of § 2(b)(2) of the Patent Act is, of necessity, purposive rather than literalistic. This is so because a literalistic reading of the provision would render the command to adhere to § 553 of the APA an empty gesture, if not an outright absurdity.
Consider: The Federal Circuit has construed § 2(b)(2)(A) to confine the Patent Office to making procedural, not substantive, rules.
160 Section 553 of the APA generally provides that, to promulgate a rule, an agency must give the public notice of the proposed rule and an opportunity to comment on the proposal.
16 1 Section 553 also expressly provides, however, that the requirements for notice-and-comment do not apply to certain types of rules-namely, "to interpretative rules, general statements of policy, or rules of agency organization, procedure, or practice."'
162
Given that § 553 exempts agency procedural rules from notice-and-comment, and procedural rules are all that the Patent Office can promulgate, commanding the Office to comply with § 553 does not literally require the use of notice-and-comment rulemaking. How, then, to break out of this logic trap?
The critical distinction that § 2(b)(2) of the Patent Act sets up is the one between more formal rules that bind members of the general public (i.e., patent applicants) and less formal rules, such as guidelines and policy statements, that do not. The Office frequently issues guidelines and other guidance documents that help inform the public of the Office's views on patent law, and, under § 553(b)'s exceptions, the Office can do so without resort to notice-and-comment. 165 By publishing these guidelines, the Office also informed the public about the Office's perspective-admittedly nonbinding-on the scope of a core substantive patentability standard. To modify the formal rules of practice before the Patent Office, by contrast, the Office must use notice-and-comment rulemaking. Indeed, the Office proposed the rules challenged in the Tafas cases in just this manner. then, that at least some patent regulations are subject to notice-and-comment rulemaking under § 553 of the APA. Were one to construe § 2(b)(2) literalistically, dispensing with any need for notice-and-comment rulemaking in a puff of logic, one would also render § 3's consultation command a nullity; it too, would refer to an empty set. Second, the legislative history of the 1999 enactment shows that, for at least three years preceding the final bill, both the House and Senate measures on this point referred not to rules "made in accordance with section 553,"170 but rather to rules "made after notice and opportunity for full participation by interested public and private parties,"' 171 i.e., notice-and-comment rulemaking. The legislative history materials do not record the reason for the surface shift to the text now codified in § 2(b)(2)(B). Whatever the reason, the best reading of § 2 is the one that harmonizes it with § 3.172 On this reading, the Patent Office can bind the public with the procedural rules it promulgates with the benefit of public comment after adequate notice, and not otherwise.
B. The APA 's Substance-Procedure Distinction
Section 553 of the APA, as just noted, requires notice-and-comment for substantive rules but expressly excepts "rules of agency... procedure" from that mandate. 173 This different treatment for substantive and procedural agency rules prompts challenges to agency rules alleged to be substantive but imposed without the requisite notice-and-comment.
174
The courts adjudicating these challenges have thus developed a jurisprudence distinguishing procedural from substantive rules for purposes of § 553. "The problem in this area, as in other areas of law, is that the distinction between procedure and substance is not always clear. Murky or not, the § 553 jurisprudence might appear-at least superficially-to be a helpful resource for distinguishing procedural from substantive rules in the But the § 553 jurisprudence is not helpful for Patent Act cases, any more than salt water is helpful for quenching thirst. The APA distinguishes procedural from substantive rules for a purpose quite removed from that of the Patent Act; the tasks are similar in name alone. In the patent system, to hold that a rule is substantive is to put it beyond the Patent Office's reach, to conclude that it invades a matter of substantive patent policy that Congress has kept for itself. The purpose of the substance-procedure distinction in the Patent Act is to preserve the division of responsibility that Congress first put in place in 1836 and that Congress can adequately police itself. By contrast, in the typical agency context governed by the APAwhere Congress has empowered an agency to issue substantive as well as procedural rules-to hold that a rule is substantive is to require the agency to promulgate the rule only with the benefit of public comment after proper notice. The purpose of the substance-procedure distinction in the APA is to protect the general public's right to participate in an agency's formulation of the rules that regulate the public's primary conduct, 179 and distinguishing exempt rules of 'agency organization, procedure, or practice' (which are generally known collectively as 'procedural rules') from non-exempt substantive rules" 
2011]
ADMImISTRATIVE LA wREVIEW where the need is too small to warrant it ... -"186 Public participation is the default, and departures must be justified. Applying this exemption-wary approach to the question whether DOL's new method for determining the unemployment rate was a procedural rule under § 553, the court acknowledged that "[t] he problem with applying the exception is that many merely internal agency practices affect parties outside the agency-often in significant ways."' 187 It framed its test thusly:
A useful articulation of the exemption's critical feature is that it covers agency actions that do not themselves alter the rights or interests of parties, although it may alter the manner in which the parties present themselves or their viewpoints to the agency.... The exemption cannot apply, however, where the agency action trenches on substantial private rights and interests. 188 Puffing examples from prior cases, the court put "a freeze placed on the processing of applications for radio broadcast stations" and "a directive specifying that requisite audits be performed by nonagency accountants" on the procedural side of the line, and deemed it substantive "when drug producers are subject to new specifications for the kinds of clinical investigations deemed necessary" for new drug approval and "when motor carriers are subject to a new method for paying shippers."' 189 Finally, turning to the new DOL rule for measuring unemployment, the court concluded that it required public participation and was thus substantive: Here, recipients of [federal] emergency job program monies are subject to a new method for determining the one undefined variable in the statutory fund allocation formula.... The critical question is whether the agency action jeopardizes the rights and interest of parties, for if it does, it must be subject to public comment prior to taking effect. 9 1 the D.C. Circuit confronted a § 553 challenge to an expedited schedule in a proceeding to review a railroad merger. 192 This expedited schedule "gave competing railroads 60 days (instead of the usual 90) to file responsive applications," and the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) issued it without using notice-and-comment rulemaking. 193 The D.C. Circuit held that the schedule was within § 553's exception for procedural rules. The court "put to one side cases like Batterton where a rule has definite substantive consequences but can arguably be called either 'procedural' or 'substantive,' and a court must decide which it is. 194 In this case, the court found it "hard to characterize the agency statement at issue ... as anything other than a rule of 'procedure."' ' 195 Nevertheless, because "all procedural rules affect substantive rights to greater or lesser degree," further inquiry was required to determine "whether the substantive effect is sufficiently grave so that notice and comment are needed to safeguard the policies underlying the APA."' 196 The court tailored the inquiry to the scheduling context: When a rule prescribes a timetable for asserting substantive rights, we think the proper question is whether the time allotted is so short as to foreclose effective opportunity to make one's case on the merits. This standard allows an agency ample discretion to structure its proceedings as it sees fit. However, when an agency abuses that discretion by creating extreme procedural hurdles that foreclose fair consideration of the underlying controversy, a court, by remanding for notice and comment, can ensure that the agency explores the substantive consequences of its "procedural" rule. 1 97 Comparing the details of the standard and expedited schedules for the ICC railroad merger review under this foreclosure standard, the court concluded that the competitor railroads' opportunity to file responsive applications with the ICC had not been unduly abridged. Were it not for the Batteron default in favor of treating agency rules as matters for noticeand-comment (i.e., as substantive), one imagines the court would not have gone to such lengths to ensure that the plainly procedural rule at issue had only modest substantive effects. (upholding a Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) "unavoidable and extreme circumstances" standard for granting leave to file late papers in the license renewal proceedings for the Calvert Cliffs nuclear facility and applying the Lamoille approach, on the ground that the NRC "standard did not foreclose participation by third parties seeking to intervene in the Calvert Cliffs proceeding").
198. Cf FED. R. Civ. P. 4(m) (providing the time within which to serve a summons); 6(a) (providing rules for computing time under the Rules); 6(c)(1) (providing that, generally, a written motion must be served at least fourteen days before the noticed hearing date); 12(a) (providing times within which an answer must be filed, depending upon stated criteria). I could go on, but you get the point. If any of these time period Rules were challenged under In American Hospital Ass'n v. Bowen, 199 a group of hospitals challenged a series of directives, transmittals, and guidelines that the Department of Health & Human Services (HHS) issued in the wake of a 1982 change to the Medicare program. Congress enacted a new review program using peer review organizations (PROs) to "crack down on excessive reimbursements to hospitals for treatments of Medicare patients. '200 Enacting only a "skeletal" framework, "Congress left much of the specifics of the hospital-PRO relationship to the inventiveness of HHS, empowering it to promulgate regulations governing PROs in order to implement the peer review program." 2 0 1 HHS issued numerous rules, but without using notice and comment. An association representing 6,000 member hospitals sued to invalidate the rules. The D.C. Circuit began by affirming "that Congress intended the exceptions to § 553's notice and comment requirements to be narrow ones": "In light of the obvious importance of these policy goals of maximum participation and full information, we have consistently declined to allow the exceptions itemized in § 553 to swallow the APA's well-intentioned directive." 2 0 2 Drawing on Batterton and other cases, the court explained that it "ha[d] generally sought to distinguish cases in which an agency is merely explicating Congress' desires from those cases in which the agency is adding substantive content of its own." 203 It then described this approach to the exception for procedural rules as "inquiring more broadly whether the agency action," in addition to having a substantial impact on parties, "also encodes a substantive value judgment or puts a stamp of approval or disapproval on a given type of behavior." 204 The court analyzed the series of directives at issue in the case in great detail, concluding that each of them was exempt from notice and comment. 205 Batterton, Lamoille, and Bowen together established a framework for scrutinizing agency rules with an eye toward strongly protecting public participation in agency formulation of the rules designed to regulate people's primary conduct out in the world, and not merely secondary conduct in presenting a matter to the agency. Thus, for example, in JEM Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 20 6 the D.C. Circuit held that the FCC was not required to use notice and comment to promulgate a set of "stringent application processing rules designed to streamline the agency's review" of a large number applications for 689 newly allotted commercial frequency modulation (FM) channels. 20 OSHA issued the directive without notice and comment, and the court held this defect invalidated the rule because the rule was substantive. Drawing explicitly, again, on Batterton and Bowen, as well as JEM, the court reasoned that "[t]he Directive is intended to, and no doubt will, affect the safety practices of thousands of employers. The value of ensuring that the OSHA is well-informed and responsive to public comments before it adopts a law and federal procedural law." 218 How does this distinction play out, and might it help us work out an approach to determining the scope of the Patent Office's regulatory power? The breadth and depth of the Erie jurisprudence and commentary is staggering. 219 Even a modest exploration of the materials would take us far beyond the scope of this Article. But a small number of its settled principles suffice to show that Erie's choice-oflaw framework offers no help at all in sorting procedural from substantive Patent Office rules under § 2(b) of the Patent Act. In Erie itself, the operative question was the scope of a railroad's duty to a person who was injured by a passing train while walking along the railroad's right of way. 22° way, the stuff of nuance and filigree, subject to heartfelt debate among judges and scholars. But the broad outline recounted here, at least, is uncontroversial. The RDA, and the Erie jurisprudence implementing it, focus on preventing forum shopping between the state and federal courts, and the frictions such forum shopping can produce. This policy response has no bearing on the Patent Act context, for the simple reason that obtaining a U.S. patent offers no prospect of forum shopping. There is one, and only one, forum in which to obtain a U.S. patent as a matter of right, and that forum is the U. 234. Green, supra note 1, at 483.
